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We analyze the capacity choice of ﬁrms under demand uncertainty in a
mixed duopoly market consisting of one private ﬁrm and one public ﬁrm.
We deﬁne a two-stage game where ﬁrms choose capacity in the ﬁrst stage
without knowing which state of Nature is going to be realized, and
output in the second stage knowing which state is realized. We address
the question of maintaining over and under capacity in the equilibrium
as a strategic device; and show that both symmetric and asymmetric out-
comes can be realized.
1I 
The sequential choice of capacity and quantity by ﬁrms in a strategic 
environment has been carefully studied in the literature of industrial organi-
zation (see Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980; Tirole, 1988, among many others).
The issue of choosing over (excess) capacity or under capacity from a stra-
tegic point of view by the competing ﬁrms was always a matter of central
debate. Various studies show the results can vary according to the modeling
environment. Interestingly, most of the studies are performed when ﬁrms are
pure proﬁt maximizers. In recent years, study of mixed oligopolies, where a
welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm interacts with proﬁt-maximizing private
ﬁrms, has become increasingly popular (see, for example, Cremer et al., 1989;
DeFraja and Delbono, 1989; Anderson et al., 1997; White, 1997, among
others).
1 In this paper, we analyze a model of mixed duopoly with one public
ﬁrm and one private ﬁrm. The public ﬁrm aims to maximize welfare (social
surplus) and the private ﬁrm is the usual proﬁt maximizer. We study a two-
stage competition between the two ﬁrms with capacity and quantity as strate-
gic choice variables. Capacities are chosen simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage
and quantities are chosen simultaneously in the second stage. In addition to
this, we also introduce an uncertain demand environment in the capacity
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1Mixed oligopolies are common in many countries. Oil industries, heavy manufacturing indus-
tries, telecommunications or the tourism industry are good examples of mixed oligopolies.choice stage.
2 When ﬁrms install capacities, they do not know which state of
demand (high, medium or low) will be realized in future. They choose respec-
tive quantities after uncertainty is resolved. In this set-up, we address the
question of strategically choosing excess or under capacity by the competing
ﬁrms in the equilibrium. We ﬁnd that if the realized demand is high or low,
the outcome of the game is symmetric between the ﬁrms in terms of choos-
ing excess or under capacity; whereas if the realized demand is medium, the
outcome is asymmetric, and, in particular, the public ﬁrm will end up choos-
ing under capacity and the private ﬁrm will end up with excess capacity.
In this framework, the competing ﬁrms not only provide best replies
against the capacity and output strategies chosen by the rival ﬁrm but also
adjust their capacities in view of meeting output demand levels varying across
the states of Nature. Thus, in this random environment, ﬁrms play a game
simultaneously against Nature and against a rival ﬁrm, where the rival ﬁrm
has a different objective. The resulting equilibrium outcomes are the interac-
tion of the two effects inﬂuencing at the same time ﬁrms’ behavior.
3
2M 
We consider a mixed duopoly market where a proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrm,
ﬁrm a, and a social-welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm, ﬁrm b,a re operating in
a homogeneous good market. Social welfare (surplus) is deﬁned as the sum
of consumer surplus and both ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
We specify the cost function as
(1)
where qi and xi are the production quantity and capacity of ﬁrm i (= a, b).
4
We assume ma < mb; i.e. ﬁrm a can produce more efﬁciently than ﬁrm b at the
efﬁcient production-capacity level.
5 Under this U-shaped cost function, the
long-run average cost is minimized when quantity equals production capac-
ity, i.e. qi = xi.
We assume that there are n states of Nature and the demand in state i
is given by
(2) pQ a Q a q q i n ii i a b () =−=− + ()=1, , ...
Cqx m q q x ii i i i i i , () =+ − ()
2
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2Recently, Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) analyzed the sequential choice of capacity and quantity
in a mixed duopoly market when the demand is deterministic. The game with endogenous
timing of choosing quantities in a mixed oligopoly was studied by Pal (1998).
3For some studies with demand uncertainty in a pure oligopoly framework (i.e. only proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms), see Perrakis and Warskett (1983), Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) and
Maskin (1999).
4The same cost structure is used in Horiba and Tsutsui (2000), Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) and
elsewhere.
5Note that ma ≥ mb will yield zero proﬁt for the private ﬁrm. Other technical conditions needed
to guarantee positive equilibrium outputs and prices in the subsequent analysis are given
in the Appendix.and
where pi is market price, Q is total output and qa and qb denote the output of
ﬁrm a and ﬁrm b,r espectively.
We study a two-stage game where ﬁrms choose capacity in the ﬁrst stage
without knowing which state of Nature is going to be realized, and output
in the second stage knowing which state is realized. We assume the existence
of an objective probability density ri, i = 1,...,n,o v er the states of Nature,
Σ
n
i=1ri = 1. Firms are assumed to be risk neutral.
3T  S P E
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Assume that ﬁrms have chosen capacities xa and xb in the ﬁrst stage. We
consider the second-stage game. The second-stage payoffs of ﬁrms a and b








By solving (5) and (6), we obtain the output levels as
(7)
(8)
Next, we consider the ﬁrst-stage game. Since we assume both ﬁrms are
risk neutral, they choose capacity to maximize expected payoff without
knowing which state is going to be realized. When they choose the capacity
scale, they know that their decision affects their output decision in the second
stage. Hence, we can formulate the maximization problem of the private ﬁrm
as follows:
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(9)
Similarly, the public ﬁrm’s maximization problem can be formulated as
The ﬁrst-order condition is
(10)






Now, comparing (13) with (11) and (14) with (12) we get Table 1. This
leads us to our main result.
Proposition: In the two-stage game in which both the public ﬁrm and the
private ﬁrm choose their capacities simultaneously without knowing the true
state of demand and then both choose quantities simultaneously after the
demand is realized, we get two symmetric and one asymmetric outcome in













































































b Ea q q
qq
mq mq q x q x
SS
subject to   and  8
















xa m m x ai
i
n

























78 subject to   and 
Choice of Capacity in Mixed Duopoly 269
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester 2006(i) Symmetric outcome: (a) when the realized demand is low, both ﬁrms
carry idle or excess capacity; (b) when the realized demand is high, both
ﬁrms’ quantities exceed their capacities.
(ii) Asymmetric outcome: when the realized demand is medium, the public
ﬁrm’s quantity exceeds its capacity and the private ﬁrm carries idle
capacity.
We believe that, when the demand is too high or low, the strategic effect
is overshadowed by the strong uncertainty effect resulting in a symmetric
outcome, despite the difference in the respective objective functions, whereas
when the demand is medium, it is more like the average demand, and there
the strategic effect overshadows the (relatively weak) uncertainty effect,
resulting in an asymmetric outcome where the public ﬁrm chooses under
capacity while the private ﬁrm chooses over (excess) capacity. Since the
private ﬁrm is more efﬁcient, the public ﬁrm tries to make the private ﬁrm
produce more while it produces less. Hence, the public ﬁrm reduces its own
capacity so that the private ﬁrm can produce more. Meanwhile, enlarging the
production share in the market is desirable for the private ﬁrm. Thus, the
private ﬁrm chooses over capacity while the public ﬁrm chooses under capac-
ity as a strategic device.
4C  R
Here, we would like to compare the outcomes in the mixed duopoly case with
the outcome in the purely private duopoly case.
Two private ﬁrms playing such a capacity-then-quantity game under
deterministic demand is exactly the benchmark case in Horiba and Tsutsui
(2000).
6 The outcome is that both ﬁrms choose excess capacity. Speciﬁcally,
xa = xb = 16(a − m)/43 and qa = qb = 15(a − m)/43.
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6In Horiba and Tsutsui (2000), the demand function is p(Q) = a − bQ and the cost function is
C(qi, xi) = mqi + c(qi − xi)
2.W hen we use the results on p. 211, especially equations (3) and
(4a), we need to note the difference in notation, demand and cost function. That is, ‘a’( =
a − m) in equations (3) and (4a) should be replaced by ‘a − m’, b = 1, and k ≡ b/c = 1.
T 1
C  C  D R D
Realized demand Public ﬁrm Private ﬁrm
ai ≤Σ
n
j=1rjaj − 11(mb − ma)/21 Excess capacity Excess capacity
(xb > qb)( xa > qa)
Σ
n
j=1rjaj − 11(mb − ma)/21 < ai <Σ
n
j=1rjaj + 11(mb − ma)/14 Under capacity Excess capacity
(xb < qb)( xa > qa)
ai ≥Σ
n
j=1rjaj + 11(mb − ma)/14 Under capacity Under capacity
(xb < qb)( xa < qa)Choice of Capacity in Mixed Duopoly 271
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If two private ﬁrms play such a game under demand uncertainty, then
we can show that both ﬁrms may choose under capacity or excess capacity
depending on the strength of the realized demand. When the realized demand
is high enough, both ﬁrms’ quantities exceed their capacities; otherwise,
both ﬁrms carry idle capacity. And the results are as follows: xa = xb =
16(Σ
n
i=1riai − m)/43 and qa = qb = (ai − m)/5 + 32(Σ
n
i=1riai − m)/215. Table 2 pres-
ents ﬁrms’ choice of capacity under different realized demand.
Thus, in these two situations, we always get a symmetric outcome. That
is, regardless of deterministic demand or uncertain demand, the outcome is
symmetric between the ﬁrms in terms of excess or under capacity in a pure
oligopoly (i.e. when ﬁrms are only proﬁt maximizers). However, both sym-
metric and asymmetric outcomes may arise in a mixed oligopoly.
A:R   P
We  need to impose some restrictions on parameters to make sure ﬁrms’ capacities,
quantities and market prices in equilibrium are positive.
(1) xa = 12(mb − ma)/7 is always positive.
(2) xb = Σ
n
j=1rjaj − 3mb + 2ma is positive when Σ
n
j=1rjaj > 3mb − 2ma.
(3) Since q
i




b = ai − 3mb + 2ma + (mb − ma)/7
+ 8(Σ
n
j=1rjaj − ai)/11 = 3ai/11 + 8Σ
n
j=1rjaj/11 − 20mb/7 + 13ma/7 are increasing in ai,
we only require q
1
a > 0 and q
1
b > 0. The condition is a1 > max{Σ
n
j=1rjaj − 121(mb −
ma)/14, 220mb/21 − 143ma/21 − 8Σ
n
j=1rjaj/3}.
(4) Since pi(Q) = 9mb/7 − 2ma/7 + 6(ai − Σ
n
j=1rjaj)/11 is also increasing in ai,w e   only
require p1(Q) = 9mb/7 − 2ma/7 + 6(a1 −Σ
n
j=1rjaj)/11 > 0. The condition is a1 >Σ
n
j=1rjaj
− 33mb/14 + 11ma/21.
Hence, we need to impose the following restrictions on parameters to make equilib-









C  C  D
R D
Realized demand Choice of capacity
ai ≤ (48Σ
n
j=1rjaj − 5m)/43 Excess capacity
ai ≥ (48Σ
n
j=1rjaj − 5m)/43 Under capacityand
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